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Abstract
The idea that the wave function represents information, or knowl-
edge, rather than the state of a microscopic object has been held to
solve foundational problems of quantum mechanics. Realist interpre-
tation schemes, like Bohmian trajectories, have been compared to the
ether in pre-relativistic theories. I argue that the comparison is in-
adequate, and that the epistemic view of quantum states begs the
question of interpretation.
PACS Nos.: 03.65.Ta, 03.50.De, 03.30.+p
1 Introduction
For the past twenty years, quantum information theory has been one of the
most rapidly developing areas of quantum mechanics [1]. Teleportation of un-
known quantum states over large distances has been reported, and practical
implementations of quantum cryptography are already available. Although
large-scale quantum computers may not be coming soon, work in that direc-
tion is likely to throw much light on the fundamental process of decoherence
and perhaps on the limits of quantum mechanics itself.
Investigations in the foundations of quantum mechanics have significantly
contributed to the development of quantum information theory. A number
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of people believe that in turn, quantum information theory has much to
contribute to the understanding and interpretation of quantum mechanics.
This has to do with what is often called the epistemic view of quantum states,
which goes back at least to Heisenberg but has significantly evolved in the
past few years [2, 3, 4]. The basic assertion of the epistemic view is that
the wave function (or state vector, or density matrix) represents knowledge,
or information. On what the wave function is knowledge of, proponents of
the epistemic view do not necessarily agree. The variant most relevant to
the present discussion is that rather than referring to objective properties
of microscopic objects (such as electrons, photons, etc.), the wave function
encapsulates probabilities of results of eventual macroscopic measurements.
The proponents of the epistemic view believe that it considerably atten-
uates, or even completely solves, the notorious problems of quantum mea-
surement and long-distance correlations. Briefly, if the wave function is in-
terpreted as referring to the objective state of a physical system, its collapse
in a quantum measurement involves a physical process that calls for expla-
nation. If, however, the wave function simply represents knowledge of the
probabilities of results, its abrupt change points to a change of knowledge,
rather than to a physical change in some microscopic system. In a simi-
lar way, the epistemic view helps removing the clash between collapse and
Lorentz invariance. In the EPR setup, for instance, Alice’s measurement of
her photon’s spin does not instantaneously produce the collapse of the spin
wave function of Bob’s photon. Rather it changes Alice’s knowledge of the
probabilities of results of spin measurements on Bob’s photon. Bob can of
course perform the measurement, but otherwise Alice’s knowledge can only
be transferred to him by conventional means.
In the epistemic view, the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics
is taken as complete, and its objects in no need of a realistic interpreta-
tion. Thus any additional constructs, like value assignments in modal in-
terpretations [5, 6], multiple worlds [7], or Bohmian trajectories [8, 9, 10]
are viewed as superfluous at best. Such constructs predict no empirical
consequences other than what is already derivable from the Hilbert space
formalism. This has lead to comparing them with the ether in classical elec-
trodynamics [11, 12, 13]. Just as the ether was discarded after special rela-
tivity had shown that it led to no specific empirical consequences, so should
additional constructs to the Hilbert space be done away with in quantum
mechanics.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the roles fulfilled
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by the ether in electrodynamics and by realistic interpretation schemes in
quantum mechanics are comparable, and whether the epistemic view provides
an adequate understanding of quantum states.1
2 Ether and field
The concept of ether has a long history, and it has been the subject of de-
tailed analyses [16, 17]. In one of its many uses, it was viewed as a substra-
tum wherein electric and magnetic phenomena take place. In the nineteenth
century, a number of complicated mechanical models were proposed to ac-
count for its properties, by such distinguished physicists as J. C. Maxwell
and W. Thomson, among others. Although a review of such models would
lead us too far astray, it is appropriate to look at the way the ether was seen
by H. A. Lorentz, at the turn of the twentieth century.
By that time Lorentz had settled on the concept of a stationary ether
introduced by A. J. Fresnel in the first decades of the nineteenth century.
Materiel bodies moving through the ether would leave it undisturbed, except
for carrying their own excess ether responsible for such characteristics as their
index of refraction. The stationary ether explained very well phenomena like
stellar aberration. It was viewed as defining an absolute reference frame, the
one in which Maxwell’s equations would hold.
Lorentz’s point of view on electromagnetic theory, “a surprising and au-
dacious step” in the words of Einstein [18, p. 35], was much simpler than
his predecessors’. For him there is ponderable matter, there are electric
charges (“electrons”), and there is the ether, “the receptacle of electromag-
netic energy and the vehicle for many and perhaps for all the forces acting on
ponderable matter” [19, p. 30]. Lorentz did not commit himself on whether
all matter is made of electric charges, nor on whether all mass has an elec-
tromagnetic origin.
As there was no reason to expect that the earth is at rest with respect to
the ether, the question arose as to how to describe electromagnetic phenom-
ena in a moving frame. What Lorentz and Poincare´ progressively realized
was that one can define coordinates associated with the moving frame and
linear combinations of the electric and magnetic field components such that
these combinations and coordinates satisfy Maxwell’s equations. This was
1Further thoughts on these questions can be found in Refs. [14] and [15], on which the
present discussion is based.
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interpreted as meaning that no electromagnetic (and, in particular, opti-
cal) measurements could reveal motion through the ether. Yet Lorentz and
Poincare´ still appealed to a dynamical deformation of bodies in motion, and
retained the notions of absolute rest and absolute time. It was Einstein’s
fundamental contribution to see that these notions could be dispensed with,
and that all inertial frames were equivalent in all respects.
Einstein could therefore do away with the ether. But the field concept
became all the more important. Hitherto dependent on the ether, the field
now acquired its full autonomy. It was no longer viewed as in need of a
substratum. The rejection of the ether, therefore, did not leave a void in its
stead. The ether was discarded as defining absolute time and motion, but its
function with respect to electromagnetic phenomena was transferred to the
field itself.
3 Bohmian trajectories
Bohm’s approach to quantum mechanics is an example of a realistic interpre-
tation. It can be formulated equally within the context of the Schro¨dinger
or the Dirac equation. We shall look more specifically at the latter.
The Dirac equation for a particle of mass m and charge e in an external
electromagnetic field Aµ is given by
− iγµ
∂ψ
∂xµ
+
e
h¯
γµA
µψ +
mc
h¯
ψ = 0. (1)
Eq. (1) implies the existence of a conserved current jµ = ψ¯γµψ, where ψ¯ =
ψ†γ0. Bohmian trajectories can be introduced by specifying that the three-
velocity of the particle at the space-time point (r, t) is given by
v = c
j
j0
. (2)
It can be shown [9, 10] that the magnitude of the velocity never exceeds
c, and that if particles are distributed according to the probability density
j0 = ψ
†ψ at a given time and follow the trajectories, they will be distributed
according to ψ†ψ at any other time. Averages computed on an ensemble of
Bohmian particles exactly coincide with averages computed by means of the
Dirac equation.
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Thus Bohmian trajectories make no empirical predictions not already
obtainable from standard (Schro¨dinger or Dirac) quantum mechanics. A
similar remark can be made about all realistic interpretations of quantum
mechanics that leave its basic formalism intact. Just like the (unobservable)
ether was discarded with the advent of special relativity, shouldn’t we do
away then with the trajectories or other additional constructs to the Hilbert
space structure?
Before examining this question, one more analogy between quantum me-
chanics and the ether should be pointed out. We have seen that in the
usual approach to quantum measurement, the collapse of the wave function
is essentially instantaneous. Alice’s measurement of her photon immediately
produces the collapse of the wave function of Bob’s. It would then seem
that wave function collapse introduces a preferred reference frame. Such a
frame also appears to be required in the Bohmian mechanics of many parti-
cles [9, 20]. One can show that this does not prevent the construction of a
relativistically covariant theory of observables, but it is a strong obstacle to
the construction of such a theory of beables [21].
4 Two explanatory roles
Bohmian trajectories and the ether are elements of two different theoretical
structures. They present both analogies and differences. The analogy that
is relevant here is that neither Bohmian trajectories in quantum mechanics
nor the ether in special relativity lead to specific empirical consequences.
Does this mean that the trajectories, or other interpretative devices, have in
quantum mechanics the same status as the ether in special relativity? And if
one can dispense with such devices, is there something which, like the field,
plays the role they would otherwise have?
To examine these questions, it is appropriate to start with the following
observation. Although all measurements are made by means of macroscopic
apparatus, quantum mechanics is used, as an explanatory theory, in two
different ways: it is meant to explain (i) nonclassical correlations between
macroscopic objects and [ultimately through quantum field theory] (ii) the
small-scale structure of macroscopic objects. To show that these two func-
tions are distinct, we will consider a hypothetical situation where only one
of them is operating.
Consider a world where objects that are not too small (say, larger than
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the wavelength of visible light) behave, for all practical purposes, like sim-
ilar objects in the real world. Classical mechanics can be used to compute
the trajectories of projectiles, and classical hydrodynamics the flow of water
in pipes. Antennas and waveguides are described by Maxwell’s equations.
Chemical equilibrium and phase transitions obey the laws of classical ther-
modynamics. All objects in the solar system have trajectories well described
by Newton’s laws of gravitation and motion, perhaps slightly corrected by
the equations of general relativity.
As we go down to scales much smaller than a fraction of a micron, how-
ever, these laws may no longer hold. Except for one restriction soon to be
spelled out, I shall not be specific about the changes that macroscopic laws
may or may not undergo in the microscopic realm. Matter, for instance,
could either be continuous down to the smallest scales, or made of a small
number of constituent particles like our atoms. The laws of particles and
fields could be the same at all scales, or else they could undergo significant
changes as smaller and smaller distances are being probed.
In the hypothetical world, some macroscopic objects at times behave in
ways that cannot be explained by the classical theories. There may be,
for example, objects like our Geiger counters that click when objects like
our radioactive materials are brought nearby. Or there may be instruments
like our Stern-Gerlach devices which, when placed in front of an oven and
suitable collimators, modify the pattern of blackening on a plate behind.
There may even be large objects like some of our particle accelerators, which
in appropriate situations produce various tracks in saturated vapour. In all
these instances, the probabilities of occurrence of events can be calculated
on the basis of the quantum-mechanical rules.
To explain the nonclassical correlations described above between macro-
scopic objects, one can think of at least two very different conceptual schemes.
One can assume the existence of microscopic objects, or “particles,” going
from emitters to detectors, ovens to plates or accelerators to vapour, whose
properties correspond to operators in the Hilbert spaces used to compute the
probabilities. Or one can refrain from postulating such microscopic objects,
and assume instead something like genuine fortuitousness [13, 22], where
clicks or “detection events” are essentially uncaused.
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5 Only one world
I now make an assumption about the hypothetical world, which characterizes
the fundamental way in which it differs from the world we live in. I suppose
that the “particles” used in the first explanatory scheme above have nothing
to do with the microscopic structure of the macroscopic objects. That is,
the ultimate constituents of matter, if any, are completely different from
whatever is responsible for the nonclassical correlations. In the hypothetical
world, the function of the quantum-mechanical rules is solely to explain these
nonclassical correlations. In that case the explanatory schemes of particles
and genuine fortuitousness are both adequate to the job.
In the actual world, however, the situation is different. The observables,
quantum numbers, and Hilbert spaces relevant to the description of particles
responsible for macroscopic correlations are the same as the ones used in
describing the microscopic structure of macroscopic objects. Rutherford’s α
particles produced by radioactive radon and scattered by thin foils of gold
have the quantum numbers of helium nuclei!
How are proponents of the epistemic view going to deal with that? One
way is to adopt a strong instrumentalist stance and deny either that micro-
scopic objects exist or have states. Indeed [13, p. 410]
[i]t is a hallmark of the theory based on genuine fortuitousness
that it does not admit physical variables. It is, therefore, of a
novel kind that does not deal with things (objects in space), or
measurements, and may be referred to as the theory of no things.
The view that microscopic objects do not exist or have no states is not log-
ically inconsistent. But it raises the question, How can macroscopic objects
exist and have states, and yet be reducible to microscopic objects that either
do not exist or do not have states? How can the world be for the formalism
of quantum mechanics to be true? That question can in fact be viewed as
the fundamental problem of the interpretation of a theory [6]. Interpreting a
theory coincides with giving one (or several) ways in which the formalism of
the theory can be truly realized. The upshot is that the strong instrumen-
talist stance that microscopic objects don’t exist or don’t have states does
not constitute an interpretation, but asks for one.
Without going so far as denying the existence of microscopic objects or
their states, proponents of the epistemic view can claim that their introduc-
tion is methodologically inappropriate [11, p. 260].
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[I]f T ′ and T ′′ are empirically equivalent extensions of a theory
T , and if T entails that, in principle, there could not be evidence
favoring one of the rival extensions T ′ or T ′′, then it is not rational
to believe either T ′ or T ′′.
Here T can stand for the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics, T ′
for its Bohmian extension, T ′′ for Everett’s worlds, etc. If T is singled out
among its empirical equivalents, it must be on the basis of criteria other than
empirical, perhaps something like Ockham’s razor. This comes as no surprise
since even within the class of internally consistent theories, acceptance almost
never depends on empirical criteria alone.
But here T is just not complete. The Hilbert space of quantum mechanics
makes contact with experiments by means of ill-defined concepts, like the one
of a macroscopic apparatus. We are never told what precise criteria of size,
mass or constitution make an aggregate of matter an apparatus. T ′ and T ′′
may be preferable to T just because they are more complete.
Neither Bohmian trajectories nor the ether lead to specific consequences.
There have been suggestions that just as the ether was replaced by the field
with the advent of special relativity, additional constructs to the Hilbert
space formalism should be discarded and replaced by the emergence of the
concept of information.
[J]ust as Einstein’s analysis (based on the assumption that we
live in a world in which natural processes are subject to certain
constraints specified by the principles of special relativity) shows
that we do not need the mechanical structures in Lorentz’s theory
(the aether, and the behaviour of electrons in the aether) to ex-
plain electromagnetic phenomena, so the CBH analysis (based on
the assumption that we live in a world in which there are certain
constraints on the acquisition, representation, and communica-
tion of information) shows that we do not need the mechanical
structures in Bohm’s theory (the guiding field, the behaviour of
particles in the guiding field) to explain quantum phenomena [11,
p. 262].
The CBH analysis referred to is an important result recently obtained by
Clifton, Bub, and Halvorson [23, 24]. Working in the setting of C∗-algebras,
these investigators characterized the quantum theory by three properties:
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(i) kinematic independence, i.e. the commutativity of the algebras of ob-
servables pertaining to distinct physical systems; (ii) the noncommutativity
of an individual system’s algebra of observables; and (iii) nonlocality, i.e.
the existence of entangled states for spacelike-separated systems. They then
showed that these properties are equivalent to three information-theoretic
constraints, namely, the impossibility of superluminal information transfer,
of perfect broadcasting, and of unconditionally secure bit commitment.
The concept of information is no doubt relevant to the first explanatory
function of quantum mechanics, the one that pertains to nonclassical correla-
tions between macroscopic objects. But it is of no help in accounting for the
microscopic structure of macroscopic objects. No proponent of the epistemic
view (as far as I know) would go so far as claiming that objects are made of
information. This is in sharp contrast with the concept of field which, unlike
information, does not need material support and carries energy and momen-
tum of its own. Even in classical electrodynamics, there were proposals that
all the mass of charged particles is in fact field energy [25]. The analogy
between field and information is defective in an essential way.
6 Conclusion
Neither the ether nor Bohmian trajectories have specific empirical conse-
quences. Special relativity, while rejecting the ether as defining an absolute
reference frame, transferred its function of substantive medium to the field
itself. Bohmian trajectories, or other interpretative schemes of quantum me-
chanics, try to make the basic variables of the theory, in terms of which the
structure of macroscopic objects is ultimately explained, intelligible. This
makes them fundamentally different from the ether, and points to the inad-
equacy of the epistemic view of quantum states.
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